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"THE strongly empirical tone of this chapter is of course due to the
absence of a developed theory of the size distribution of income." Thus
does George Stigler summarize a textbook chapter entitled "The Size
Distribution of Income." [1] The validity of this remark has led me, in
several places, to attempt creation where a critical recounting would
otherwise have been more appropriate; where there was no theory and
I thought I could provide at least a sketch of one, I have tried to do so.
However, there are a good many bits and pieces of theory lying around
in the literature that can, with a little trimming of edges, be fitted into a
mosaic called "The Theory of Income Size Distribution"; the major part
of the paper is concerned with this task.
These theoretical fragments are very disparate and sometimes are not
presented in a form that indicates their relation to income size distribu-
tions. Among the arguments that do refer explicitly to income size dis-
tribution, some refer only to a single year, others to the lifetime incomes
of a cohort; some refer to individuals and some to families; some to
single types of incomes and some to all types combined; some to pretax
and some to post-tax income, etc. If a survey of all this is to be more
than a mere catalogue, items must be forced into categories with in-
evitable discomfort for straddlers.
The categories I have chosen are, in the logical sense, arbitrary: they
have no claim to preferment beyond expository convenience. They re-
flect a definite view as to the role of economic theory in the present
context; the purpose of an economic theory is to provide hypotheses as
Nova: This paper is part of the research begun on a Ford Faculty Fellowship
in 1961—62. G. J. Stigler made a number of helpful criticisms but is in no way
implicated in the final product.206 Theory of Income Size Distribution
to the direction and, where possible, the extent to which changes in
certain structural parameters alter the size distribution of income or
some component thereof. Among the more important of these parameters
are those reflecting technology, tastes, and the distribution of natural
abilities. Other relevant parameters are degree of resource utilization,
rate of economic growth, and degree of monopoly power. It is the
business of a theory of income size distribution to relate the shape of
an income size distribution to these and other structural characteristics
of an economy.
The emphasis of this paper is on theory; empirical findings are con-
sidered only to the extent that they bear upon some theory or the lack
of same. But our coverage of theory is only partial. The paper con-
centrates on the forces that determine the distribution of the earnings
of human resources, and their implications for the distribution of in-
comes among families. Except in passing, it does not consider the
determinants of the distribution of property income among individuals
and families. This omission occurs mainly because it is believed that a
theory of the size distribution of property income should emphasize
different forces than one pertaining to the distribution of labor income;
e.g., attitudes toward risk bearing and the role of income and inheritance
taxes are of much greater importance in explaining the distribution of
property income. This is not to argue that a "unified" theory of size
distribution is impossible, but only to suggest that near term progress
is more likely if we analyze labor and property incomes separately.
Another gap in coverage arises from neglect of what has traditionally
been a major concern of size distribution theorists: the characteristics
of the frequency function used to describe the (size) distribution. The
reason for this.neglect is in no way pejorative. It is simply that much of
the relevant work cannot, as yet, be related to the main body of eco-
nomic theory. Where economic theory has been used to draw implica-
tions concerning the empirical characteristics of income size distribu-
tions, as in the work of Lebergott Becker [3, 4] and Mincer
[10, 11] the subject is given due attention.
In this paper, the income of a recipient unit is assumed to result from
the sale of services—personal or property—and from government trans-
fers. Private transfers from other recipient units, eleemosynary institu-
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aside, the discussion refers to societies where the income receiving unit
is approximately the same as the contemporary primary family. In
communities where extended kinship arrangements prevail, claims to
income accruing to distant kinfolk drastically alter the meaning of asset
ownership from what it is in a contemporary western society. This fact
greatly complicates the comparison of distributional inequality between
societies having widely different rules concerning the sharing of what-
ever is considered as economic goods. This is not to say that distribu-
tional questions in primitive societies are either uninteresting or unim-
portant, but only that economic theory in its present state has relatively
little to say about them.
Present economic theory bears upon income size distribution mainly
through its implications for the size distribution of rewards for produc-
tive services. If we accept the conventional, but very arbitrary distinction
between an "initial" distribution of income that results from the ex-
change of productive services, and a "secondary" redistribution by trans-
fers, voluntary 'and involuntary (e.g., taxation), then the relevance of
present economic theory is confined almost entirely to explaining the
initial distribution. Economic theory is relevant to analyzing the feed-
back effect (via incentives) of the redistribution upon the initial distribu-
tion. However, the characteristics of the redistributive mechanism itself
are considered as data.
This is simply to note that economics does not yet have a usable
theory to explain any of the following: the size or composition of
expenditures of the public sector; the allocation of a given tax burden
among income receiving units; the allocation of revenue raising as
between fees and taxes. So far as income distribution is concerned, the
public sector does "as the Prince wills" and the economist accepts the
will of the Prince as a datum. This being the case, present economic
theory is less potent the greater the role of the secondary redistribu-
tion in determining the final distribution.
Following a customary though not universal practice, I shall assume
that the "fundamental" income distribution is that determined by the
prices of factor services multiplied by the quantities sold. Other possible
distributions are assumed to be transformations of the fundamental one,
the equations of transformation reflecting the interrelation of wealth
ownership (human and nonhuman) with the possession of (other)208 Theory of income Size Distribution
relevant socioeconomic characteristics. This assumption is not innocuous,
and to some extent it is contrary to fact.1
Moreover, one well-known hypothesis about income distribution, the
Keynesian or widow's cruse theory, expounded by Boulding [5], Kaldor
[6] and others, explicitly relates aggregate factor shares to the aggregate
saving propensity which in turn is widely believed to be related to the
size distribution of income. Thus, by implication, we are assuming
either (1) that a family's saving propensity is not related to its income
level or (2) that the relative share of family income derived from each
type of factor is the same at all levels of family income, or both.
(2) is patently contrary to fact (Kravis [7], P. 193) while (1) has been
much debated during the last decade. However, to keep a complicated
subject from becoming completely unmanageable let us assume that
savings propensities and expenditure patterns generally have no effect
upon the income size distribution.
Now for some brief remarks on the need to provide minimum sub-
sistence for all members of the community. In most societies some
provision is made for assuring a minimum income to every member
sufficient for his survival. In time of famine or other disaster this
minimum may be breached perforce, but normally it is provided. The
existence of this (implicit) minimum income limits the possible income
size distributions the community will tolerate.
For example, suppose a community's output of foodstuffs is F1 and
that it has n members whose average productivity in terms of food-
stuffs is F1/n and whose minimum income is F2/n (F2 <Fi). (For
simplicity assume the economy to be closed.) Then the possible size
distributions must lie between complete equality at one extreme, where
everyone receives Fi/n and, at the other extreme, F2/n to the poorest
n —1persons and F1 —[(n—1/n)F2]to the rich man. In communi-
ties where per capita food productivity is not greatly above the sub-
sistence minimum (i.e., where F1 and F2 are not very different), the
requirement that no one receive less than F2/n greatly restricts the
possible values of (say) the Gini income concentration ratio. For such
communities, it is useful to subtract from total output the subsistence
requirement, F1 —F2,and analyze the distribution of surplus, net output,
1 For example, to the extent that Negroes per se are paid less than whites, their
relative concentration in certain occupations causes the wage rates paid in those
occupations to be lower, thereby affecting the fundamental distribution.Theory of Income Size Distribution 209
etc., rather than of gross output including subsistence (i.e., income).
The preceding paragraph is very Ricardian in spirit. Indeed, Ricardo's
treatment of labor's share can, without substantial change, be con-
sidered as an analysis of the income share of an homogeneous class
of low income receivers relative to all others, who are presumably
richer. As this particular theory is quite familiar, I shall not expound
it further though it may still have contemporary relevance for newly
developing countries. In eschewing further consideration of the Ricardian
theory, I bypass its self-conscious concern with the effect of changing the
numeraire. In this matter, I follow virtually all modem writers, who
consider the size distribution of income as the distribution of a magnitude
measured in money.
Except for a few places where it is absolutely essential to assume
otherwise, I shall argue as though the size distributions under discussion
can be fully described by two parameters, mean and variance (dis-
persion). On this assumption, the degree of inequality in a distribution
is conveniently and conventionally measured by the variance. In parts
I and II, I shall discuss the income size distribution as it would be,
under various alternative assumptions, in a situation of competitive
long-run equilibrium. By a competitive long-run, I mean a situation in
which the rewards of all factor services are equal to the values of
their respective marginal physical products; the reward of any factor
is the same in all of its uses; and consumption of all services and
acquisition of all assets is carried to the point where marginal utilities
are proportional to prices. Economic rationality of all resource owners
and users is assumed. (For simplicity, corner solutions are assumed not
tooccur.)Ialso abstract from risk and uncertainty and assume
that individuals behave as though they anticipated correctly and were
certain that they did so. One particular implication of these conditions
is that investment of all kinds, both in human and nonhuman capital,
is carried to the point where its marginal product is equal to the rate
of interest.
Long-run competitive conditions are always satisfied on a balanced
growth path of which a stationary state is a special case arising when
the growth rate is zero. Accordingly our point of departure is a com-
petitive economy lying on some balanced growth path. Since the savings
ratio has been assumed independent of the variance of the income size
distribution, it does not matter what growth rate is posited.210 Theory of Income Size Distribution
One final assumption: in discussing long-run income distribution, I
refer to the distribution of the present value of lifetime earnings.
Fluctuations in income related to life-cycle earning patterns, transitory
disturbances, etc., are ignored in this context. These important transitory
phenomena are discussed later.
DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL INCOME
Assume that individuals (or their families) invest their wealth so as
to make its yield equal in all outlets, human and nonhuman. Given
this condition, the distribution of income among recipients will be
proportional to the distribution of wealth, including human capital (i.e.,
capitalized wage earning capacity), with the rate of return as a factor
of proportionality.
Assume that at some initial moment, t0, there is a given stock of
wealth and a given distribution thereof among wealth-owning units. The
wealth is valued at a given set of competitively determined long-run
prices that remain unchanged throughout the time period under discus-
sion. The ith recipient's wealth at t0, will accumulate at a rate
[1 + —c(t)Jwhereis the rate of return to the ith recipient
andis the rate at which he consumes his wealth. Where=
therecipient's wealth will be constant over time. His income over the
interval,ti —to,is wo f' d:(dropping the superscripts); his
savings over the same interval are W0 f dtand his saving
£0
ratio, the ratio of the two integrals, 1 —(c/r).Obviously, if some indi-
viduals have higher a's, (a =r — c)than others, their wealth and in-
comes will grow faster and eventually the size distributions of wealth and
income will approach a limit such that the ratio,
I.e., if the r's are equal for all individuals, at the limit incomes will tend
to proportionality with savings ratios.2
2Atthe start of this accumulation process, the approximation may be poor as it will
be greatly influenced by the relative sizes of initial wealth endowments, but
this factor will become less important with the passage of time, vanishing at the limit as
w0(ae"di
Atany moment t0(g >0),—i- = ;as t grows, shrinks in-
J e"di J e"di
definitely for both i and], a >0.Theory of Income Size Distribution 211
It might seem that equilibrium would require that r be the same for
all individuals but this would be true only in a world in which knowledge
(of all asset yields) was either free or could be acquired by all corners at
the same price. Obviously, this cannot be descriptively accurate. Yet it is
also true that "knowledge" of an asset's yield, once obtained, can be
disseminated at a very low marginal cost, and frequently is. To be sure,
wealthy individuals, wisely, spend more than poorer ones in testing and
conürming information, but the poor can and do get tips on how
insiders are investing. In short, the theoretical relation between the size
of a recipient unit's wealth and the rate of return earned is very
complicated and I shall not attempt to explore it. Faute de mieux, I
shall abstract from differences among the byassuming them equal.
INHERITANCE AND FERTILITY
One factor obviously related to the long-run forces affecting the size
distribution is the set of rules governing inheritance. Suppose that all
heirs of a given wealth owner share equally in his estate. Also suppose
that all income, from labor service as well as from property, derived
from any asset owned by any member of the family is pooled without
any effect on the incentive either to work or to save; i.e., an individual
in his role as producer is the (inalienable) property of his family.
Then, abstracting from discontinuities through time in births and
deaths, the growth rate of the wealth of the ith family (the ith individual
and his heirs) will be where b is the growth rate of the family
population; i.e., a/b is the growth rate of per capita wealth of the ith
family. Per capita wealth and income in the ith family will be growing,
stationary or declining as ab. The ratio of the wealth and income
of the ith family to that of the jth family will approach
asymptotically with the passage of time. In other words, under these
assumptions, wealth and income will tend to proportionality with per
capita saving ratios (remembering that all r's are assumed equal).
As soon as we abandon the assumption of equal inheritance among
family members, matters become more complicated. We must distin-
guish between intrafamilial and interfamilial income dispersions. Suppose
that each family has a set of inheritance rules that prescribes the
wealth-income share of each individual in the family total, and that212 Theory of income Size Distribution
each family's saving is done collectively so that it has its own saving
ratio which is fixed once-for-all. Then the intrafamilial income dispersion
will be determined by these rules.
By definition, income shares cannot be negative and realistically there
is, for each individual, an absolute minimum income in any society, and a
minimum income share in societies like ours. Thus, the lower the growth
rate of the per capita savings of a family, the greater will be the
fraction of the family's income preempted for meeting minimum income
requirements and the smaller the part accessible to forces making for
inequality.3
The inequality of wealth shares implied by a community's typical set
of inheritance rules is obviously an important determinant of the degree
of inequality in its wealth-income distribution. Given our assumptions,
in the long run it would be the dominant factor if there were no
correlation between a family's per capita saving rate and its institution-
ally determined degree of intrafamilial income inequality. However, if
families with the most equalitarian inheritance rules were also those
with the highest per capita saving rates, then the tendency for inter-
familial inequality—measured by the variance of the distribution of per
capita income among families—to increase over time, would be coun-
tered by a relative decline in the share of total income received by
families with relatively great degrees of intrafamiial inequality. The net
effect of these counterpoised tendencies on the per capita size distribution
of both income and wealth depends upon the (asymptotic) per capita
interfamiial variance of income, the set of intrafamilial income variances
(among individuals) and the correlation between a family's per capita
income and its intrafamiial income variance.
There are, I suspect, deep and largely unexplored institutional forces
relating the dispersion of per capita income among families and the
dispersion of income among individuals within a typical family. For
example, where the mores that govern sharing within an extended family
group are roughly equalitarian and effectively enforced, there is less
need for the community to redistribute from richer to poorer individuals
(which tends to reduce per capita income differences among families)
in order to maintain minimum standards. This collective need is felt
more strongly in periods of low (total) community income (when many
The role of the subsistence minimum in limiting inequality in the Ricardian
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persons are in danger of falling below the conventional minimum) than
in more prosperous times. Consequently, while the pressure for a
conventional minimum income tends to induce a negative correlation
between the degrees of intrafarnilial and interfamilial inequality among
different communities (or within a given community over time), the
strength of the correlation varies inversely with the level of community
income.
A second factor might well work in the opposite direction;i.e.,
toward a positive correlation between the degrees of intra- and inter-
familial inequality. This factor may be called the "hierarchical tend-
ency." In communities where delegation of authorityisdrastically
restricted and it is felt necessary to parallel "degree of responsibility"
with share of income, family heads will have larger shares of family
income and "important" families will have larger shares of community
income than where the reverse is the case.
Thus in comparing different communities in respect of the impact
upon distributional inequality among individuals of (1)inheritance
rules and (2) societal rules for limiting inequality among individuals
(which imply interfamiial transfers), it is important to recognize that
the two types of rules are connected in a number of ways—more than
specified here—but at the present state of knowledge, it is impossible
to make useful generalizations. The speculations of Schumpeter [8] on
the rise and fall of families are very relevant to research in this area,
but they do not take us very far.4 Clearly, further research is needed.
While this problem isintriguing analytically,itisimportant to
remember that the argument is based on the very restrictive assumption
that labor earnings as well as property income are pooled within a
(potentially very much extended) family, which robs the model of
direct relevance to the real world. Most likely, its main interest will lie
in its use as a tool to analyze the size distribution of property income
in isolation, with labor income analyzed separately. A start on such
In discussing the distributional implications of inheritance rules, it is essential
to bear in mind that the meaning of ownership of property may vary from one
situation to another. Consider: the recipients of foundation fellowships are re-
ceiving the income of property alienated (put in trust) by its erstwhile owner.
The substance of the situation might be identical, but the effect on the statistics
of family income distribution very different, if the fellows were adopted by the
head of the family awarding the fellowships. In other words, the meaning of in-
come distribution varies with the nature and importance of the restraints on dis-
position of economic resources one "owns."214 Theory of income Size Distribution
a line of analysis has been made recently by Professor Meade [9].
However, as he recognizes, his analysis abstracts from the effect of
investment in human capital on the size distribution of earnings and/or
on the relative shares of labor and property income. Since the size
distributions of these two types of income are very different, varying
their relative shares is likely to affect the size distribution of all income
combined. More generally, Meade's. argument simply accepts the wage
share of the national income as a datum and does not attempt to explain
either its size or its distribution among income size classes.
Clearly, an extensive formal analysis of the implications (for income
size distribution) of the properties of various growth models is an item
for the research agenda in this area. However, so far as I am aware,
Meade's essay is the only work done thus far. Consequently, I shall
not attempt to discuss the over-all income size distribution further, but
will concentrate on the distribution of labor earnings.5
In Sections II and Ill, the discussion proceeds on the assumption
that all income receiving units have only one earner and that all property
belongs to him as well. (In Section IV this assumption is abandoned,
in order to discuss the distribution of family income.) This particular
assumption has the virtue of enabling us to treat income distribution
among recipients as uniquely determined by the distribution among the
heads of units, free of the important complications of multiple earners,
transfer payments based on size of family, etc.
Ii. The Distribution of Labor Earnings
in the Long Run
DEMAND CONSIDERATIONS6
The distribution of labor earnings, like the prices of labor services,
ultimately depends upon the interaction of supply and demand forces.
At almost the moment of going to press, I have come upon an unpublished
paper by 3. E. Stiglitz, "Distribution of Income and Wealth Among Individuals"
(Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 238, Nov. 9, 1967). A hasty perusal
suggests that this contains a very elegant development of some of the ideas dis-
cussed here. Moreover, it seems clear that Stiglitz has, in a number of important
respects, carried the analysis substantially further than any previous treatment
(including this). So far as they deal with the same topics, this discussion and
Stiglitz's seem to come to the same conclusions. However, I have not yet had
sufficient time to study the paper to comment on its details.
6Throughoutthis section, and especially in the next few pages, I shall draw
heavily on a previous paper [12].Theory of Income Size Distribution 215
However, before considering their interaction it is essential to consider
the two sides of the market separately. First, let us consider demand.
To isolate the role of demand assume that the supply of labor
services of every kind is exogenously determined and has zero "price"
or rate of reward elasticity to any occupation or suboccupation. I.e.,
whatever the relative attractiveness of an occupation, there is nothing
by way of training or education that any individual can do to make
himself more attractive to employers within it. In other words, assume
the labor supply characteristics of a population depend entirely upon
exogenously determined tastes and talents. On the side of demand,
assume that all employees are hired for a standard work week and that
employers believe they can judge prospective worker performance with
complete certainty; i.e., neither variations in weekly hours nor demand
uncertainty (except where the contrary is explicitly stated) plays any
role in the argument.
Given these assumptions, differences in demand prices for the services
of particular individuals wifi determine the distribution of earnings
among them. For simplicity assume that individuals differ only in re-
spect of a single all-purpose "capacity," and are evaluated by prospec-
tive employers on the basis thereof.7 The distribution of income wifi
then, depend upon: (1) perceived differences in output or performance
among the workers; (2) the degree of consensus among the employers
as to the relative merits of the performances of individuals, and (3)
the marginal utility attached to superior performance by employers.
The simplest case is where performance is measured by physical out-
put commanding a market price. In this case the income distribution
among m individuals using identical quantities of complementary factors
would be determined by the condition that the relative incomes of any
two individuals must be proportional to their respective outputs, with
product price being a factor of proportionality.8 The distribution of
earnings in this case has been discussed by A. D. Roy [13).
This case has an obvious similarity to textbook discussions of em-
ployer demand for productive services, but unfortunately itis very
atypical of the real world. In most cases, the marginal physical product
7Alternativelythis assumption might be interpreted as referring to the distribu.
tion of income or prizes in a single occupation where performance was ranked
or measured by a prescribed set of rules as in a golf tournament.
8Jam here abstracting from both monopoly and indivisibility.216 Theory of Income Size Distribution
of a worker cannot be measured in practice and in many cases quantifi-
cation is impossible even in principle. Nonetheless, the market somehow
generates pecuniary evaluations, which are inherently quantitative, and
relative rewards. Directly or indirectly, it does this through the (implicit)
auction of goods and services among rival claimants, even in cases where
output units are heterogeneous and incomparable except in terms of
selling price.
To see this, consider the difficult case of evaluating the output of
painters, musicians, craftsmen, etc. While differences in output among
"workers" of this type may contain a quantitative component (square
inches of canvas covered or concert hours performed), there is un-
doubtedly a qualitative one as well, so that some artists earn much
more per unit of output (measured on some nonpecuniary scale) than
others. To avoid irrelevant complexity assume each painter to produce
only one unit of output per time period which is consumed (physically
destroyed) during the period. Also suppose that all consumers have
identical preference maps, so that there is an unanimously accepted
ranking of painters in order of merit (which I assume to be synonymous
with desirability of possession). Further assume that prices of paintings
are set by a conventional auction. Then a work—unit of output-'.--of a
higher ranked painter will always command a higher price than that of
one ranked lower.9 Furthermore, the difference between the prices paid
for works of two different painters provides a measure of the difference
in the value of their respective output units.1°
Given the distribution of wealth among employers (buyers), in-
equality among the prices of painters' output would be increased by
similarity of buyers' quality rankings. Consider first the case where there
is little or no similarity in the rankings of various artists by potential
buyers. In this case, "strength" of individual preference would not
affect relative prices because all painters would have roughly the same
composite ranking, and no individual's work would be more actively
For simplicity, assume that all output units of a given painter sell for the
same price.
10Thismeasure is, of course, not the only possible one. For example, the total
sales revenue from selling a specified number of output units of painter A on an
"all or none" basis might exceed that from selling an equal quantity of B's out-
put, even though (at certain quantities) the price of a unit of B's output exceeded
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sought than that of another. Clearly, if there were no similarity among
buyer rankings, selling prices would be little affected by the strength of
buyers' preferences among the output of competing painters. In this
case, each art patron would obtain a substantial amount of consumer
surplus and, assuming their output quantities to be equal, there would
be little distributional inequality among the painters.
At the other extreme, where all buyers have identical tastes, the work
of the most preferred painter would command the highest price, yield-
ing him the highest income. Assume that per capita wealth and its
variance among non painters is given.11 Then, the difference between the
income of the most preferred painter and that of the "second best" re-
flects the strength of the (universal) preference for (the amount of
pecuniary difference the buying community attaches to) the work of the
best over that of the second best painter; analogous statements apply
to the income difference between the second and third best, etc.12 The
size of the interrank differences in painter income will increase with
per capita income (variance constant) and with the variance of income
among buyers (per capita level given). That is, artistic superiority is a
"superior" good.
The imaginary example of the painters is of no interest in itself. How-
ever, it serves as a paradigm for a large number of situations where the
distribution of income is strongly influenced by the extent of differential
preference for superiority. Wherever a strong consensus on ranking
exists and a value is attached to superior rank, rewards will tend to
parallel rank. Cases where this relationship is very pronounced arise
among professional athletes where the rules of the game map a set of
performances into a rank order; sometimes (e.g., in professional tennis
and golf) a specific monetary payoff is attached to each rank. Game type
situations (where winning, losing and ranking are reasonably objective)
tend to generate substantial degrees of inequality among the participants.
These situations include law (banisters) and commission selling of all
kinds, as well as participation in games per Se.
Thereason for excluding painters is to enable us to treat the effect of wealth
changes of art buyers as exogenous, which simplifies the discussion without obscur.
ing matters of substance.
This sentence expresses a definition; not an empirical statement. The strength
of an individual's preference for A over B is defined as how much more he would
pay for the (only) unit of A than for the unit of B.218 Theory of income Size Distribution
In game type situations, winning may be valued for itself, but more
often it serves as a means to pecuniary ends. The champion usually
draws a larger paying audience than other players; the clients of a more
successful lawyer, or the employer of a better salesman, have a greater
expected gain (gross of compensation to the lawyer or salesman) than
those of one less successful. Where differential performance is directly
related to pecuniary returns, the distribution of rewards is similarly re-
lated. But where differential achievement does not have a specific
monetary effect, more complicated relations may arise; e.g., rewards
may be related to rank order of performance; to "quality" of perform-
ance (regardless of rank) or to both.
In nongame situations relative performance may be difficult to rank,
e.g., in teaching. Difficulty in ranking is, of course, related to lack of
generally accepted standards of performance, though the two are really
different matters: i.e., there might be generally accepted methods' of
ranking, but disagreement as to desiderata. Where rankings differ widely
among prospective employers, demand tends to be spread more or less
evenly among candidates for (say) teaching posts, tending to equalize
teacher earnings.
Because the rank order of teachers' performances cannot be deter-
mined operationally, institutions cannot be sure of the relative quality
of their employees and by the same token cannot be humiliated by
being caught in the act of employing somewhat "inferior" ones. Con-
sequently, those employers of teachers who are concerned with the
reputation of their pedagogues, rather than with their actual perform-
ance, wifi substitute cheaper ones whenever the adulteration of the
product cannot be detected. Other employers, pressed hard by budget
restraints, will find vague or contradictory rankings an excuse to opt
for lower-priced teachers: "one isn't sure that they are really inferior
and, even if the worst is true, it is not at all clear how serious are the
consequences."
Ignorance of relative merit is not the same as indifference to it, but
one fosters the other and their combined effect acts as a serious brake
upon attempts to attract superior teachers by competitive bidding.13 The
Therelation between knowing and caring about rankings is complicated.
However, I doubt that it will be disputed that knowing a rank order—given some
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above remarks refer to "pure" teachers. Where research is involved,
publication facilitates comparison, and the grant obtaining process assigns
dollar magnitudes to (some aspects of) differential success.
The reason for these rather discursive remarks on the relation of rank-
ing to the determination of demand prices for qualitatively different
services is the lack of a suitable general purpose scale for measuring
value differences in heterogeneous economic goods. The theory of de-
mand is, after all, a matter of the interrelation of prices and quantities
of homogeneous goods. Therefore, it is natural for economists concerned
with this problem to seek parameters which reflect differences in de-
mand intensity in situations where differences in marginal products are
not conducive to quantification.
One parameter which a number of economists have seemed to find
useful may be termed, following Mayer [15], the "scale of operations"
effect. The cluster of ideas underlying this concept has been discussed
by Simon (14], Jacques [16], Lydall [17, 18], Tuck [19] and Reder
[12], as well as by Mayer.
To fix ideas, think of every human agent, self-employed or wage
earner, as manager of a block of resources, human or otherwise. Assume
that within each job class or occupation there is unanimity as to the rank
ordering of individuals with reference to their desirability as employees;
also assume that nonpecuniary preferences exercise no effect on choice
of employment. Then to get a superior employee it will be necessary to
pay more than to obtain one who is inferior. Consequently, in equilib-
rium, the rank of employees in terms of desirability will correspond to
their rank in the earnings hierarchy.
The hypothesis is that the most desirable employees will also be those
to whom it is found profitable to assign the largest "scale of operations."
I would suggest that an individual's scale of operation be measured by
the (total) value product of the resources he manages; i.e., the value of
superior performance (to an employer) on a given job increases with
the value of the resources the job holder manages. Most writers have
discussed an individual's scale of operations in terms of the number of
his organizational subordinates rather than the value of the resources
in Employment in the Service Industries, Princeton for NBER, 1956, pp. 130—132,
argues in a somewhat similar vein concerning the earnings of teachers vis-a-vis
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he manages. However, there is no reason to ignore nonhuman resources
in this context; diamond cutters are paid more (per hour) than cutters
of less precious materials; operators of more expensive machinery more
than those of less expensive. Indeed, as Mayer [15] and Jacques [16]
point out, the relation of compensation to degree of "responsibility"
is a widely accepted principle of job evaluation.
To ward off any possible squabble over claims to priority in discover-
ing this indicator of demand intensity, permit me to quote from a little-
known eighteenth century precursor:
Fourthly, the wages of labour vary accordingly to the small or great trust
which must be reposed in the workmen.
The wages of goldsmiths and jewellers are everywhere superior to those
of many other workmen, not only of equal, but of much superior ingenuity,
on account of the precious materials with which they are intrusted.
We trust our health to the physician; our fortune and sometimes our life
and reputation to the lawyer and attorney. Such confidence could not
safely be reposed in people of a very mean or low condition. Their reward
must be such, therefore, as may give them that rank in the society which
so important a trust requires. The long time and the great expense which
must be laid out in their education, when combined with this circumstance,
necessarily enhance still further the price of their labour.'4
The empirical evidence to support the existence of a scale of opera-
tions effect is, at best, scattered. One of the more important pieces (of
evidence) concerns the relationship among compensation of corporate
executives, current sales of their companies and current profits of their
companies. It appears that the partial regression of compensation on
sales, profits constant, is much stronger than that of compensation on
profits, sales constant, though both partial regression coefficients are
positive. This relationship has been found by Roberts [22], Patton [23]
and McGuire, Chiu and Elbing [24].
This particular finding implies that the differential contribution of a
superior executive to a firm (over that of an inferior one) is more closely
related to a firm's scale of operations (measured by sales) than to its
current profits. That is, superior management may be manifested by
minimizing (unavoidable) losses as well as by earning current profits.
A positive association of executive compensation with sales (scale of
14A.Smith,The Wealth of Nations, Book I, Chapter X, pp.93—94, Everyman's
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operations) is what would be expected if differential compensation were
related to differential skill via the scale of operations effect.
In principle, this association should be found among employees of
any rank. Unfortunately, detailed information is not readily available
on compensation of employees within given occupations by the volume
of resources managed. It is generally believed that wages vary among
firms, with capital per head, and the results of empirical studies of
(aggregate) production functions confirm this relation in the large. But
available evidence is not, as yet, very impressive so far as the present
argument is concerned.
Nevertheless, I am inclined to believe that the scale of operations is
an important determinant of relative demand prices for various types
of employees. If so, one can say that within an occupation or job class,
the dispersion of demand prices for workers varies with the dispersion
of gross value product per worker. However, scale of operations is not
the only parameter affecting these relative demand prices; there is also
"sensitivity."
The sensitivity of a job varies with the concern an employer has with
the performance of its holder. Formally, we might define the sensitivity
of a job as some indicator of the range of its possible value products,
the actual value product attained varying with the skill of the job holder,
the value of complementary resources constant; unfortunately, this does
not help much. It is perhaps more suggestive to designate a job as rou-
tine or insensitive (having low sensitivity)if there is but a negligible
marginal product to a higher degree of any aptitude beyond that
commonly possessed by persons filling such jobs. Bank teller is a good
example of a job having low sensitivity though utilizing a large volume
of complementary resources. Despite numerous jokes about the dangers
of abscondence, banks do not seek unusually honest men or offer them
high salaries to induce them to become tellers. Character references, a
bond and minimum standards of aptitude and education suffice.
Examples of jobs with high sensitivity are those of trial lawyer
(barrister) or surgeon. Superior trial lawyers get cases involving larger
sums thantheirinferiors,and top-notchsurgeonsoperate upon
wealthier bodies than the average. This might suggest that we are still
observing the scale of operations effect. But this is only partially true:
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yet their earnings dispersionis much lower.15 Similarly,internists,
psychiatrists and other medical specialists treat both rich and poor, but
their income dispersion is generally believed to be less than that of
surgeons. These differences in dispersion I attribute in large part to
different degrees of concern for superiority and hence to greater con-
centration of demand on the best people (with consequent greater dis-
persion of fees and incomes) among surgeons and barristers than among
others. This differential degree of concern for superiority is what is
meant by different degrees of sensitivity among jobs. Adam Smith (in
the passage quoted above) lumped scale of operations and sensitivity
into "trust." 16
Other cases where sensitivity visibly affects the dispersion of earnings
occur where star performers (athletes, concert musicians, actors, etc.)
earn more than their managers but other performers earn less. The
conflict between sensitivity and responsibility (scale of operations) is also
observed in civil service and other formal organizations, especially in
universities, where the market for star researchers sometimes requires
15 See Royal Commission on Doctors' and Dentists' Remuneration: 1957—1960;
Command Paper 939, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1960, Table 7, p.
37. The upper quartile is 193 per cent of the median for barristers; 155 per cent
for solicitors; the highest decile is 358 per cent of the median for barristers, but
only 235 per cent for solicitors.
16 the Smithian argument is appealing to common sense and hardly new,
it has never been incorporated into the main part of price theory. This is no place
to work out the details of an appropriate theoretical development, but its general
lines would be as follows: Assume that higher quality workmen have a higher
supply price to an employer. The reason for paying the higher price necessary to
obtain superior workers to process a more valuable material is the same as that
for taking greater pains (spending more) to guard objects of greater value.
Assume there is a known probability of dollar loss—through damage—to an
object, which is an increasing function of the object's value, and a decreasing func-
tion of the amount spent to protect it. (I abstract from loss through theft in order
to avoid complications of a game theoretic nature.) Assuming the owner (Or in-
surer) of the object maximizes expected utility, he will spend an amount on pro-
tection that makes the reduction of expected dollar loss (marginal gain) from
added protection equal to the marginal cost of providing protection. The reduction
in expected dollar loss from a given increase in protection will increase with the
value of the object but the marginal cost of any given amount of protection is
independent of the object's value (or varies only slightly with its value) so that at
a level of protection at which marginal gain equals marginal cost of protection for
a less valuable object, it exceeds it for one of greater value and hence protection
is pushed further. To hire better quality workmen is to provide more protection
for materials; assuming that higher quality workmen have a higher supply price,
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that they receive higher salaries than their own organizational superiors
as well as of others "responsible" for resources of much greater value.
That the conflict between market and organizational imperatives is not
always resolved in favor of the former does not gainsay the point under
discussion.
In fine, both scale of operations and degree of sensitivity are param-
eters related to differential demand prices for workers' services. The
former has the decided advantage of frequently being measurable in-
dependent of its effect on income while the latter, in general, is not.
However the relevance of the latter factor should not be overlooked.
SUPPLY CONSIDERATIONS
The discussion of the previous section was concerned only with
causes and effects of differences in demand prices on differential earn-
ings in various occupations. That it may be suggestive of certain ob-
servable phenomena indicates that we are dealing with situations where,
for one reason or another, lower earners are unable to change their
characteristics so as to become very close substitutes for those earning
more. However, if sufficient time is allowed, there is a good deal of
supply elasticity to most sets of personal characteristics that yield un-
usually high earnings, and we must take this into account.
In general, if a particular degree of a particular capacity is highly re-
warded, investment in training can often duplicate—or at least approxi-
mate—it, thereby increasing its relative supply and reducing its relative
reward. Indeed, earnings associated with a given degree, y, of any
capacity, A (call it A,,) cannot exceed those of(or by more
than the marginal cost of transforming (training) persons withto A,,.
To appreciate the role of training in limiting the dispersion of earn-
ings, suppose a given set of employer demands confronts a given set of
native talents)7 Then, in long-run equilibrium the lower the elasticity of
substitution among different kinds and qualities of service, and the
greater the dispersion (among individuals) of degrees of each kind of
Nativetalent is obviously not an easy concept to define, and its proper defini-
tion varies with the problem. For the present purpose, we may suppose it to be
the capacity of individuals at any age at which further training or education
occurs outside the family. Obviously, this definition ignores all-important differ-
ences in training within the family whose effects are confounded with those of
genetic factors.224 Theory of income Size Distribution
talent, ceteris paribus, the greater will be the dispersion of earnings.18 In
a given disequilibrium situation, assume that the distribution of earnings
is such that some earning difference, e.g., that associated with —B1,
exceeds the marginal cost of transforming (through training) a lower
earner into a higher. In order to reach equilibrium all such opportunities
must be exploited lowering the earnings of the A9's and raising that
of the B1's, thereby making the dispersion of earnings less than if such
training were technically impossible. The greater the price of resources
used in training and the greater the physical quantities needed to
accomplish given results, the fewer will be the "scarce talents" subjected
to competition from trained substitutes, and the fewer the individuals
whom it will pay to train in order that they may compete with higher
earners. Hence the greater the general level of training costs, the dis-
persion of native talents given, the greater the dispersion of earnings.
In practice, differences in earnings reflect both differences in the
amount of capital invested in training and in native talent. If native
talent were the same for all individuals; if they all had the same tastes
and could obtain capital for training purposes on the same terms, then
in long-run equilibrium earnings would be the same for all.
It is probable that relatively high costs of securing capital for training
are associated with relative deficiencies in native talent,'9 and also that
perceptions of relative deficiencies in learning capacity tend to dis-
courage investment in training the less talented. For both reasons, it is
likely that there will appear to be a positive association of amount of
education with both native talent and earnings.
Differential capacity of individuals (or their families) to finance or
otherwise obtain access to training has always been an integral part of
18 If employers generally accept indefinitely inferior services as substitutes for
superior ones because of arbitrarily small differences in price, the dispersion of
earnings will be zero (in long-run equilibrium), no matter how great the dispersion
of talent. Conversely, if all individuals have the same native talent and training, the
dispersion of earnings will be zero no matter how anxious employers are to obtain
superior quality.
19 This may be due to a correlation of genetically associated incapacity of off-
spring with low wealth of parents. Relatively poor parents, because of their poor
credit standing, can borrow for training of their offspring only at relatively high
rates of interest, if at all, and hence are deterred from doing so. But irrespective
of genetic factors, capacity to benefit from training is strongly associated with
home environment so that children of low income families—who "can't afford to
invest in training"—appear from an early age to be relatively deficient in intellec-
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the intercorrelation of training, talent and earnings. Consequently, it is
reasonable to suppose that a reduction in the difference in marginal cost
of borrowing for training purposes (as between any pair of individuals)
would alter their relative earning capacities. That is, a reduction in the
dispersion of borrowing costs among individuals would tend to increase
the relative amounts of training undertaken by the less talented (who are
also the low earners), which would tend to raise their earnings relative
to those having an initial advantage in acquiring training.
However a further analytical consideration, and one with considerable
practical importance, complicates the relation between unequal access
to training and unequal earnings. The marginal return imputable to
native talent relative to that imputable to training, will surely vary as
investment in training becomes greater and more widespread. As appro-
priately trained persons become more abundant, jobs which have paid
well heretofore because of the great training required, but which require
little native talent, will decline in earning power relative to those requir-
ing greater degrees of native talent.2° If it should happen that those in-
dividuals who initially received more training, because of easier access,
should also have more native talent than others, then the effect of
equalizing access to training might increase the dispersion of earnings
and not the reverse. That is, as the relative advantage (of the initial
high earners) from greater training diminishes, their earning advantage
from greater native ability may increase sufficiently (because of its in-
creased scarcity relative to investment in training) to overbalance the
effect of a more equal distribution of training.21
The practical importance of this point stems from the worldwide
trend toward more equal opportunity for education and training, at
least within industrialized countries. On grounds both of ethics and
efficiency, I approve of this trend. However, it is by no means clear that
its consequences will be egalitarian, that it will make the distribution of
20 It is important to note that this argument implies both an increase in total
investment in training and more nearly equal access to what training there is. It is
a combination of both that is usually intended by the phrase "more equal oppor-
tunity for education," but it is nonetheless important to distinguish between the
two. It is unlikely that merely transferring "education" without increasing the total
"amount" available would have the effects usually expected of broader educational
opportunity.
21 Though unlikely, it is possible that this could occur even though the initial
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earnings more equal. As indicated in the previous paragraph, itis
possible—though by no means certain—that reducing differences in
access to opportunities for training (combined with an increase in the
general level of training) will increase the dispersion of earnings. A
"meritocracy" may be more just than an aristocracy, but it is not clear
that it will be more egalitarian.22
In the discussion thus far we have treated native talent as though it
had but one dimension. This obscures certain problems as well as being
patently false. Accordingly, let us consider a two-dimensional (two-
talent) concept; i.e., let native talent be a vector of two components.
The difference between the one- and two-talent cases arises from the
possibility of various correlations between the talents. If the correlation
between the two is very strong and positive, the two-talent case de-
generates to the one-talent. But if the correlation is strongly negative
and the two talents are of roughly equal economic importance, this case
will exhibit less dispersion of earnings than that of one talent. For
example, suppose that earnings are an increasing function of each talent
and the talents are scaled so that earnings are a function of the sum of
the "scores" on each. Then, if the summed scores of all individuals were
equal (implying, inter alia, negative correlation between the rank of an
individual in respect of one talent and his rank in respect of the other)
earnings would be distributed equally. Although negative correlation
between the two talents is an equalizing factor, it is not hard to con-
struct examples where moving from a one-talent to a two-talent situation
would increase the dispersion of earnings even though there were nega-
tive rank correlations of these two talents among individuals.23 Increas-
ing the number of talents beyond two does not appear to add any sub-
stantively interesting results.24
22 This point is analogous to an argument of A. D. Roy [25).Itis also made by
Meade [91, p. 61. I am indebted to E. C. Budd for the Meade reference.
23 For instance, consider the case where the rewards are paid in the form of $1
for each "point" on each capacity, and both capacities are distributed normally
with negative correlation between them, but with different variances. Suppose that
initially, earnings depended only upon the capacity with the smaller variance. Then
whether introducing the second capacity into the payoff mechanism decreases dis-
persion will depend upon the relative size of the two variances and the strength of
the (negative) correlation. If the variance of the second capacity is enough larger
than that of the first, earnings dispersion may increase even with perfect negative
correlation.
24 For further discustion of the role of different capacities in determining rela-
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Another important aspect of the earnings distribution is revealed by
examining the case where "talent" is identified with ability to work in a
particular occupation. Assume, for simplicity, that an individual can
practice only one occupation at a time, and that the dispersion of talent
for occupation A is greater than for occupation B where talent is
measured in "points." Then an increase in demand for the services of
A relative to B will increase the value of a point of A talent relative to a
point of B talent thereby increasing the over-all dispersion of earnings;
the reverse will apply where there is an increased relative demand for
B services. Clearly the over-all size distribution of earnings will be
affected by the pattern of demand for labor. The greater the tendency
for employers to demand those services the talent for whose production
(allowing for training) varies greatly among persons, the greater the
dispersion of earnings, and vice versa.25
GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM
The discussion in the demand section ran in terms of variables rerated
to capacity to produce desired results, but in the supply section the
argument was concerned with various types of "talent" presumably
measured by performance on tests. A theory of income size distribution
consistent with (general equilibrium) theory requires that a set of trans-
formations be established between the units of "talent" that measure
supply and the units of "capacity" that measure demand. Needless to
say, I cannot specify such a set of transformations nor so far as I am
aware can anyone else at this time. This deficiency is serious.
Economic theory evades this problem by classifying productive serv-
ices into factors of production each of which has an equilibrium price.
But this expedient makes the question of determinacy a crucial one.
Quite apart from matters of. functional form, it is a fundamental ques-
tion as to whether there is a set of classes of productive services (factors)
whose number and dimensions are such that both the units of supply
and the units of demand can be transformed into them, so as to yield
determinate and consistent price-quantity relations.
One possible approach to this problem is suggested by Tinbergen
[20]. He proposes (in effect) to replace a set of discrete factors of
25 J do not elaborate on this point, despite its importance. One reason is that it
would take us too far afield; also it is well discussed, though very briefly, by A.
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production by a continuous function of many attributes of personal
capacity; different factors of production would then be represented by
different positions on the function (i.e., by different combinations of
attributes). Whether this procedure will solve the problem depends on
whether it is possible to find a suitable set of attributes 26 and to define
supply and demand functions upon them such that consistent and de-
terminate price-quantity relations will result.
Personal attributes such as intelligence and physical strength are better
suited for measuring supply than demand. What employers seek is "pro-
ductive capacity" which is separated from "personal attributes" by a
thick curtain of sociopsychological variables conveniently labeled in-
centive, attitude and experience.27 It is safe to say the role of these
variables in the theory of wages is not well understood. Scale of opera-
tions and sensitivity are interesting correlates of labor demand; they are
important indicators of the demand prices for (successful) applicants
for particular jobs but they are not useful indicators for analyzing the
demand for the services of individuals.
The distinction between the demand price for jobs and that for the
services of individuals is important because job characteristics are deter-
mined simultaneously with wage rates: job characteristics should be
endogenous in a general equilibrium model. For example, if managers do
26 It may be that there is none. For example, employers may, at initial hiring
levels, demand personal attributes definable in terms of objective criteria. How-
ever, subsequent advancement may depend also upon past performance as per-
ceived and valued by the employer or his representatives. This would imply that
employer demand functions were defined in terms of both personal attributes and
past performance. A useful theory of labor demand would then have to include
an employer response mechanism to past performance. The "Theory of Rank," a
la Tuck, Simon, Lydall, et al., might be viewed as a first—though excessively
"static"—approach to such a theory.
2T Tinbergen's discussion relates primarily to the supply side. If employer demand
were for the same attributes—or some transform thereof—as workers supply,
the problem would be solved. But, in general, employers are not interested in the
physical strength, dexterity, intelligence, etc. of their employees except insofar as
these are indicative of performance. And it is at least possible that the character-
istics employers seek—consciously or otherwise—cannot be consistently trans-
formed into those that workers supply. If this is the case, imbalances between
supply and demand (either in units relevant to supply or in those relevant to de-
mand) have to be adjusted by nonprice rationing and/or by adjustments of
characteristics demanded or offered, as well as of wage rates. If so, institutional
rules governing these adjustment procedures would have to be built into the
theory as an integral part. I shall discuss this possibility in a short-run context
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not vary greatly in capacity, neither will firm sizes nor their salaries. That
is, equality of managerial skill wifi encourage an industrial structure of
numerous small firms, each firm manager having relatively few subor-
dinates. Conversely, large differences in managerial skill will promote
an industrial structure conducive to large firms (each employing many
workers) and to a correspondingly large variance of salaries and scales
of operation among the members of the labor force.
Of course, the distribution of managerial capacities does not operate
alone; it interacts with a set of technological possibilities, transportation
costs, etc. to determine firm size, income distribution, etc. But the direc-
tion of its thrust is clear. Similarly, if reliable workers able to utilize
delicate machinery are scarce, and the damage done by inadequate
workers great then, technology given, the economy will tend to specialize
in products, production methods and organizational forms that minimize
capital per worker thereby limiting his scale of operations. By making
the number of an executive's subordinates a "technological" datum in-
stead of an economic variable to be determined by the system, Lydall,
Tuck, et al., improperly exclude supply factors from the picture.
HUMAN CAPITAL
The above discussion portrays the theory of income size distribution
as a cluster of imperfectly joined, ill-fitting pieces. Superficially, at least,
this view is quite different from the bold and imaginative picture pre-
sented by Gary Becker [4]. Becker's model is, in principle, one that ex-
plains the distribution of earnings as resulting from the investment of
differing amounts of capital in the various members of the labor force.
In essence Becker assumes each individual to invest in himself a
quantity (measured in dollars) of training and education such that the
marginal rate of return on investment equals the marginal rate that must
be paid to obtain funds. Each individual has a demand curve (D) for
investment in his own capacity which relates the amount invested to
marginal rate of. return, and a supply curve (S) of funds (for such
investment)thatrelatesmarginal costof borrowing toamounts
borrowed. Becker shows quite easily that to obtain a finite amount of
investment, either D must slope downward or S upward, or both.
If two or more individuals had identical D and S curves, they would
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had the same demand curve (i.e., identical abilities) but different supply
curves, then investment and earnings would be greater the lower the
individual's borrowing costs. Conversely, if all individuals had the same
supply curve but different demand curves, investment and earnings
would be greater for individuals with greater abilities. In the general
case, both supply and demand curves differ among individuals, and the
resulting distributions of investment and earnings depend upon inter-
correlations of the parameters of these curves (i.e., upon whether those
with greater ability also face lower borrowing costs or the reverse) as
well as upon their elasticities.
While this analysis, to which I cannot do justice in a few paragraphs,
is valid within a properly restricted domain, it does not provide a basis
for a generally applicable theory of the size distribution of earnings.
The principal difficulty is that the shapes of the demand and supply
functions are not given independently of the set of equilibrium prices,
but reflect and vary with them. This can lead to situations where
as between two positions of static equilibrium, A and B, A has a
greater variance of human capital than B, but B has a greater variance
of earnings. Thus moving from A to B would increase the variance of
earnings but decrease that of human capital.
Consider the following possibility. The S curves of most individuals
become more elastic, in the vicinity of their previous equilibrium posi-
tions, while no one's S curve becomes less elastic. Given all D curves, it
is plausible to suppose that this rotation of S curves causes the distribu-
tion of human capital to become more equal, though this result is not
logically necessary. But it is quite possible that this would lead to an
absolute reduction in the supply of untrained workers, reducing outputs
and raising prices of commodities in whose production they specialize.
Suppose that the dispersion of native talent for unskilled work is much
greater than for other types, and that differences in capacity for un-
skilled work cannot be greatly reduced by training. Then, if the price
elasticity of demand for the output of the "unskilled sector" is sufficiently
low, and the dispersion of native talent in producing the output of this
sector sufficiently great, the effect of drawing off part of its labor supply
will be to increase over-all dispersion of earnings despite the more equal
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In effect, what I am saying is that altering the shapes of the supply
curves of funds (for investment in human capital) for a large number of
individuais may so alter relative prices of products and native talent as
both to lower some individuals' demand curves for human capital (by
raising the earnings those with great native talent must forego in order
to receive training) and simultaneously to increase their earnings.28 For
some of these individuals, the D curves might even have negative ordi-
nates over some part of the investment axis. This result could arise not
only from the aforementioned shift of S curves, but also from a shift in
tastes away from the output of trained workers toward that of untrained
workers, at given prices and incomes.
This is not to argue that the distribution of human capital is unre-
lated to the distribution of earnings. Rather it is to say that both distri-
butions are determined simultaneously by an underlying set of con-
sumer tastes, productive techniques and wealth ownership. The distribu-
tion of wealth greatly influences the shapes and positions of the S curves.
These underlying variables determine the positions and interrelations of
the D and S curves through relative prices. They also determine the size
and distribution of the stock of capital (human and otherwise) and the
distribution of earnings. Any particular relationship between the size
distributions of human capital and of earnings is conditional upon the
interrelation of these underlying exogenous variables.29
One further point made by Becker especially merits comment. He
argues that in the absence of fairly strong negative correlation between
ability and marginal borrowing costs, ability and self-investment will be
positively correlated, even if both were symmetrically distributed. The
purpose of this is to show how a symmetrical distribution of ability can
be reconciled with a skewed distribution of earnings. It has often been
argued that any satisfactory theory of income size distribution must make
this reconciliation because abilities are distributed symmetrically
28At the outset of his paper, Becker assumes that no part of a worker's income
is return to native ability, which would preclude this possibility. However, this
assumption is arbitrary, as he admits.
29 It should be obvious that the spirit of these remarks is quite similar to that
in which Mrs. Robinson has quarreled with users of the concept, "quantity of
capital." However my intent is less destructive than hers sometimes appears to be;
I insist only that users of S and Dcurvesconsider whether these curves remain
unaltered (and if not how they are altered) by changes in exogenous variables or
functional forms that cause changes in relative equilibrium prices.232 Theory of income Size Distribution
the size distribution of earnings is positively skewed. I offer the following
remarks on this contention:
(1) Not all income size distributions are positively skewed, or skewed
at all. Staehle [26] showed many years ago that, among manual workers,
distributional symmetry of earnings is approached quite closely once the
effect of unemployment is eliminated. Miller [29, pp. 18—28 and 5 8—63]
also presents data from the 1950 Census to the same general effect. This
is not to deny that the over-all earnings distribution is skewed, but to
raise a question as to the range of applicability of a theory that implies
skewness.3°
(2) It is only a complete theory of income size distribution that must
reconcile a symmetrical distribution of abilities with a skewed distribu-
tion of earnings. Becker's theory does not pretend to completeness as it
abstracts from risk and uncertainty. Friedman [27] has argued that
skewness can result solely from phenomena related to differential atti-
tudes concerning risk bearing. If so, there is no need for Becker's argu-
ment; indeed, it is necessary to show that the simultaneous operation of
the forces operating in Becker's model, together with those operating in
Friedman's, generates a plausible degree of skewness—neither too much
nor too little.
(3) Lydall [18], Simon [14] and others have also provided rational-
izations of skewed earnings distributions by means of the scale of opera-
tions effect, as well as other explanatory variables. Mincer [10] pro-
vides two distinct rationalizations of the skewness of aggregate earn-
ings distributions. To the extent that their arguments are valid they
must be integrated with one another, and with Becker's, to show that a
complete model generates an empirically relevant functional form for
the earnings size distribution. So long as a theory does not purport to be
complete it is not necessary that it make the aforementioned reconcilia-
tion; it is sufficient that it not preclude such a reconciliation being made
by other parts of the model.
3°Onthis point, an earlier version of Becker's theory [3, p. 65]veryneatly
explains Miller's findings [29] that skewness is found mainly in occupations re-
quiring a great deal of education. The argument is that earnings are a weighted
sum of return to (symmetrically distributed) unskilled ability and to investment
which is asymmetrically distributed; the investment component is greater in occu-
pations requiring more schooling. This feature of Becker's theory has, for some
reason, been abandoned in the later version [4].Theory of Income Size Distribution 233
ill. Life Earning Patterns and Social Stratification
In the previous section, we have ignored the well-known association
of age with earnings. However, theorists of income distribution have
been very anxious to explain life-earning cycles and especially differences
in these cycles for persons at different levels of education. We now turn
to this subject. The argument of this section refers mainly to short-period
variations in income distribution, e.g., year to year, and not to those
longer periods in which variations in the distributions of wealth and
income are more or less proportional.
One hypothesis is that age associated variations in average earnings
parallel variations in productive capacity. Its rationalization is as follows:
earnings data indicate that an individual's productive capacity reaches
an age peak that occurs later in life, the more important are experience
and education, and the less important physical strength and dexterity, in
his occupation.31 It seems reasonable to suppose that the greater the
relative importance of the training-experience component in a given
occupation the greater will be the average number of years of schooling
of its practitioners. It follows that average (arithmetic mean or median)
earnings will peak later among groups of persons with more (average)
years of schooling than among those with less.
Whether the hypothesis of life cycles in productive capacity could be
used to develop a consistent theory of the interrelation of age, earnings,
education and occupation, without reference to cost of training con-
siderations is not clear. In any case, it has never been done and at this
point it seems quite unnecessary in view of the work of Mincer [10, 11].
Mincer has shown how the costs of training generate, for those with
relatively more schooling (1) greater average lifetime earnings; (2)
steeper average interage earning gradients until the year of peak earn-
ings; (3) greater earnings dispersions within specific occupations or
(years of schooling) groups and (4) greater interoccupational dispersion
of earnings at given ages. Mincer's earlier work dealt mainly with the
effects of schooling. In a later paper he extended the argument to cover
on-the-job training [30].
The work of Becker, Mincer and others is based upon one particular
31Goodsummaries of the empirical evidence can be found in Mincer [10] and
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view of human capital formation. This view assumes that an individual
produces human capital by investing his own time and other resources
during a training or schooling period and obtaining a return during a
subsequent "productive" period. Periods of on-the-job training and of
part-time work while at school combine investing and producing but
this complication makes no difference of principle.
So long as education or training is general,32 the human capital pro-.
duced is embodied in the individual receiving it, and he can sell its
services (though not the asset itself) to whomsoever will buy. But if
the training is specific a somewhat different situation arises. Specific
training creates human capital that isjointly owned by a specific
employer and the employee in whom it is embodied.33 Either can, by
severing the employment relation, unilaterally destroy the asset; there-
fore cooperation of both is essential to its use. The fact that the asset
isjointly owned creates a field in which two-party bargaining can
operate to affect the distribution of its yield between its owners.
Because Of this, the decision-making machinery concerning hiring,
firing and wage setting has very important effects upon the distribution
of earnings. To see this, consider the hiring process for permanent
jobs, especially where suitability for promotion is an important con-
sideration. The employer invests time and money in screening applicants;
successful applicants are then given more or less specific training. Sub-
sequently, after the elapse of some time, they are again screened for
promotion, for further training, etc. Hiring from outside may occur at
any stage of this process, but only if suitable insiders in sufficient
numbers are unavailable; ceteris paribus insiders are preferred to out-
siders.34
The "promotion from within" story is an old one, but it has a sub-
stantial degree of validity. It is entirely compatible with the prevailing
theory of investment in human capital once itis recognized that a
substantial part of such investment takes the form of employer know!-
32 Becker (3, pp.11—281distinguishes between "general" and "specific" training.
General training is that whose marginal product is the same to a large number
of firms; specific training has a marginal product of zero to all employers except
one. Intermediate cases can be imagined, but have not been analyzed thus far.
The capital is jointly owned in the sense that its utilization requires the con-
sent of both owners (employer and employee).
reason is simple: insiders have already been screened and given relevant
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edge of employee capability and probable behavior. Very often what
an employer searches for via a screening process is evidence of capacity
to learn and also of "good character"; i.e., evidence that the individual
is unlikely to pilfer, malinger, quit or (sometimes) encourage union-
ization.3s With this knowledge as a basis, investment is made in specific
training whose use provides further knowledge of capacity and character,
etc.
Due to technical progress, the human capital created by a given firm
may depreciate very rapidly. Yet the year to year movement in the
earnings of the workers who embody it may not reflect this fact; the
employer having begun to retrain them—if training was not actually
continuous—as soon as their coming obsolesence became clear. That
is, a company's employment policy may be one of offering employees
a life-time career, including frequent "injections" of training (formal or
otherwise). What the employer hires is a mixture of current labor
services, L1; detailed knowledge of the individual's capacities relevant
to promotion, L2; and a reserve of trained labor services available to
meet increased demand, L3. The demand price for L2 and L3 is clearly
conditioned by the employer's knowledge of the worker's present capac-
ity, and his estimate of the worker's capacity to learn as this has been
indicated by his past performance. A satisfactory worker who has been
employed for some time by employer A is clearly worth more to him
than to employer B to whom he is a more or less unknown quantity
requiring screening and observation. This is, of course, in addition to
the difference in his value to A and B that results from specific training;
the latter difference would exist even in a world of perfect information.
The relative importance of the different kinds of benefit (L1, L2 and
L3) that an employer expects to derive from a given act of hiring will
vary both with the type of worker, and with the state of the labor
market for that type of worker. Individuals hired with the thought of
a permanent connection and the expectation of receiving a substantial
(employer) investment in training are expected to make relatively large
contributions to L2 and L3 and relatively small ones to L1; those hired
for only short periods and who are expected to receive little training
"Character" is closely related to probability of quitting with resulting loss of
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are expected to make a relatively large contribution to L1 and a small
one to L2 + L3.
To oversimplify grossly, let us dichotomize the labor force into per-
manents and temporaries: the latter contribute only to L1, but the
former make a substantial contribution to L2 + L3 as well as to L1.
Permanents include most skilled and many semiskilled manual workers
as well as white collar workers and executives; temporaries include some
semiskilled and most unskilled workers. Each hiring of a permanent
involves substantially larger costs for selection and initial training than
is associated with the hiring of a temporary. Consequently, for equal
declines in demand for current output, permanents are much less subject
to layoff than temporaries.36 Moreover, to avoid loss of their investment
in selection and training, employers use indicators of a low propensity
to quit (marital status, age, education, race, letters of recommendation,
etc.) as important criteria for selection among applicants for permanent
posts.
When a firm is confronted with a need for additional workers to fill
jobs above the starting level, it has a choice between promoting those
already hired (promotion from within) and hiring from outside. Even
apart from important morale effects, which only strengthen our con-
clusion, the greater prime costs of hiring and giving (specific) training
to outsiders militates against hiring them unless there are no suitable
candidates within the organization. This, along with nonvested pension
rights and other benefits that accumulate with seniority, explains the
well-known sharp decline in interfirm mobility that comes with age.
The hiring cost bias in favor of promotion from within puts permanent
workers in a situation in which an over-all increase in labor demand
accelerates their progress up a job ladder. This accelerated progress of
itself increases their earnings which reduces the labor market pressure
on any individual firm to raise wages on particular jobs to prevent
defections. However, if all firms are simultaneously confronted with an
increase in labor demand some wifi probably have to bear the cost of
36Thisargument is made, with supporting evidence by Oi [33] and Becker (3,
pp. 24—25].Mincer[30, p. 69] expresses doubts as to the conclusiveness of Oi's
evidence on the ground that the observed relation may be spurious because of
failure to standardize for age and to distinguish between general and specific on-
the.job training. The argument advanced here leads to the same conclusion as that
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hiring from outside at above customary starting ranks. This will create
opportunities for costless (to workers) transfers for individuals
part way up the job ladder thereby engendering labor market pressure
on wage rates at these ranks.37 Conversely, declines in over-all labor
market demand will be manifested in slackened rates of "job progress"
as well as in wage cuts or involuntary job separations or both.
The situation of temporary workers is obviously different. From the
employer's point of view, a continuing employment relation with such
workers is of little or no value. Hence declines in demand for output
are reflected in dismissals and, depending on circumstances, wage cuts
while increases in demand generate unfilled vacancies or wage rate
increases. To put the matter in a slightly different way, L1 varies more
closely with demand for current output than L2 + L3. Hence over the
course of a business cycle, demand for temporaries varies more than
demand for permanents.38
For reasons already indicated, employers are much more selective of
permanents than of temporaries. Also, many temporaries prefer per-
manent jobs from which they are, in "normal times," excluded by
screening. However, when the demand for current output is strong
enough, L1 rises, relative to L2 + L3, sufficiently to induce employers
to relax hiring standards on permanent jobs. That is, they find that the
L1 component on a permanent job has risen sufficiently to warrant
bearing additional costs per hiring (on account of higher losses from
turnover, higher failure rates at on-the-job training, etc.) in order to
maintain a given rate of new hires. Relaxing hiring standards is thus a
substitute for raising wage rates while maintaining a constant hiring
rate.
Increasing the fraction of the labor force put through the screening
and training process increases the fraction effectively eligible for per-
manent jobs. This is because one of the functions of hiring standards
is to hold down the number of persons given a trial on a permanent
ladders and related concepts are discussed by Kerr [341.
38into the human capital framework, our argument may be restated as
follows: divide the (hourly) compensation for permanent workers into wages and
"employer financed specific training." The effect of an increase in demand for
permanents is reflected, in part, by extending "employer financed specific training"
to individuals who would not have qualified previously; conversely for a decrease
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job. Relaxing the standards, presumably, reduces the fraction of "suc-
cesses" per hire, but it also increases the total number of successes.39
This has the effect of relatively increasing the supply of permanents,
and relatively decreasing that of temporaries, for a substantial interval
after an initial period of labor market tightness has relaxed. This ex-
plains, in part at least, the quasi-permanent reduction in the skill
differential that took place after each of the two world wars [36, pp.
269—76].
It is tempting to identify temporary workers with unskilled, and to
a considerable extent I shall do so. However, this is an exaggeration
that does violence to such facts as the short-term employment engage-
ments of self-employed professionals (lawyers, physicians, accountants,
etc.) who possess general training and are hired as experts for short
periods.40 It is probable that it also does violence to the wage-employ-
ment behavior of those unskilled workers who do have permanent job
affiliations. Nevertheless, the overlap of the categories of temporary and
unskilled is very substantial.
The relevance of the distinction between temporary and permanent
workers to the size distribution of earnings arises from its common
relation to risk of unemployment. For example, Mendershausen [31]
found that the coefficient of concentration of incomes among "lower
income" urban recipients increased from 1929—33. Mendershausen in-
terprets this as reflecting the behavior of wage income in the face of
great unemployment. Kravis [7, pp. 215—16] also seems to conclude,
though hesitantly, that the bulk of the American evidence indicates
that an increase in the unemployment percentage has been associated
with an increase in the coefficient of concentration of urban family
"Forexample, during World War II members of minority groups, especially
Negroes, were first given opportunities to acquire skills associated with permanent
jobs, and many remained thereafter as part of the skilled labor force.
40Inorder to function in this manner, it is necessary—though not sufficient—
that such persons be generally trained. One reader has commented that the fact
of short-term engagements of self-employed professionals must be reconciled with
the identification of the categories of temporary and unskilled. The reconciliation
lies in the distinction between general and specific training: the common charac-
teristic of unskilled workers and highly skilled professionals who are hired on a
short-term basis is lack of specific training. A lawyer hired by a corporation for a
particular case is hired because of his general training, and is not subjected to a
lengthy indoctrination in company policies; a staff lawyer hired more or less
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incomes. Soltow [32] found that, during the 1930's, the prolonged
secular decline in the coefficients of concentration of income within a
number of Norwegian cities was temporarily but sharply reversed. He
(Soltow) [32, pp. 94—1001 argues that this interruption of trend reflected
the operation of "cyclical forces." In his paper in this volume, T. P.
Schultz similarly finds a variation in income concentration with the
state of the labor market due to variations in skill margins and the
unemployment percentage.
Before adducing more evidence, let me relate that already cited to
the dichotomy between permanent and temporary workers. What is
alleged is that the relatively low hourly wage earners experience pro-
portionately greater increases in unemployment when the over-all un-
employment percentage, U, increases, and conversely when U decreases.
Thus, declines in U reduce the annual earnings of those who receive
initially low animal earnings relative to those initially earning more,
thereby increasing the coefficient of concentration within the lower
section of the earnings distribution;the converse occurs when V
increases.
This relation of changes in U to changes in earnings concentration
will arise if among various categories of wage earners there is (1) an
inverse correlation between initial size of average straight time hourly
wage rates and the algebraic size of the percentage change in U and
(2) the percentage change in relative hourly wage rates does not have
"too strong" a positive correlation with the initial levels.
First consider (2). It is widely agreed that in periods where major
variations in U occurred (e.g., during the two world wars and major
depressions such as 1920—21 and 1929—33) unskilled wage rates rose,
in percentage terms, relative to skified rates when U declined, but
declined relative to skilled rates when U rose. In more moderate
fluctuations, such as occur during the ordinary short business cycle, the
same pattern of association (as during major swings) between changes in
U and changes in skill differentials is observed but it is not quite so
sharply defined, nor is the agreement on its pattern quite so general.4'
But though there may be doubt as to whether there is a cyclical pattern
Thishas been discussed by a number of authors. A reasonably complete
bibliography is in Reder [36, especially p. 260, fn. 1], a good recent reference is
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of fluctuation in skill differentials of the above kind, no one has suggested
that the actual pattern is the reverse; i.e., it has not been suggested
that the skill differential expands in prosperity and contracts in depres-
sion. And it is obvious that if (1) is satisfied and the percentage change
in wage rates is uncorrelated with initial levels, the aforementioned
relation between changes in U and changes in the coefficient of con-
centration of earnings will hold.42
Now let us consider (1). (1) reflects the hypothesis that fluctuations
in U impinge more heavily on temporaries than on permanents and
assumes that temporaries generally earn lower wage rates than per-
manents. Temporaries are disproportionately found in such occupational
categories as (nonfarm) laborers and semiskilled operatives; they are
also found disproportionately among young workers (14—19 years of
age), especially recent labor market entrants, and among nonwhites.
Examination of the behavior of unemployment percentages among these
groups (in which temporaries are heavily represented) reveals that they
move consistently in the same direction as U for the labor force as a
whole, but with a greater amplitude.43
This pattern of associated fluctuations in relative wage rates, relative
unemployment percentages and variations in the concentration of the
size distribution of earnings reflects the special role of employer knowl-
edge in the formation of human capital. Employers invest in the specific
training only of individuals with certain characteristics, though the
criteria for selection vary with the state of the labor market. That is,
on-the-job training is offered to some individuals more readily than to
others; the bases of selection of trainees are, for example, education,
42 Lydall [18] shows that changes in wage differentials are, in general, biased
as estimates of changes in over-all wage concentration. So far as it goes, his
argument is correct; however, for the present purpose, it is sufficient that wage
concentration should move in the same direction as the skill differential.
For example, see Manpower Report of the President, March 1966, Appendix
Tables A-12, A-13 and A.16, pp. 167—70. In an earlier paper [35], I discussed this
same issue in a slightly different context and presented some relevant data.
The differential behavior of unemployment percentages of whites and non-
whites has been analyzed by Gilman [37]. Gilman's data show that the unem-
ployment percentage of nonwhites has a greater proportional variability, over the
course of the business cycle, than that of whites. However, this difference is due
largely to the relatively greater numbers of nonwhites in unskilled manual occupa-
tions. When the data are standardized for occupation, the aforementioned cyclical
differential disappears. I interpret this as support for the hypothesis advanced in
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performance on written tests, absence of a police record, absence of
physical defects, etc.
The basis of selection generally used tends adversely to affect the
employment opportunities of members of racial or ethnic minorities.
However these bases need not imply a "taste for discrimination," though
such a taste probably exists. A policy of rejecting applicants for
permanent jobs on the basis of race, ethnic origin or obvious marks of
low social status may be entirely consistent with a policy of maximizing
some function of (private) pecuniary income. Where these socio-ethnic
characteristics are strongly associated with high quit rates, inferior edu-
cation, poorer health, etc., and where it is easier—and cheaper—to
identify individuals by these personal characteristics rather than by the
behavioral propensities they are presumed to betoken, the cheapest way
to select employees may be on the basis of those readily ascertained
social characteristics. But the consequence of such economic rationality
can be racial, ethnic and (social) class discrimination in hiring.44
In terms of human capital formation this means that, from the private
point of view, an employer's favorable opinion of an individual (as a
prospective employee) is a valuable asset, having labor market effect
much like training and education. Because favorable employer opinions
result from characteristics attributed to or associated with formal edu-
cation, part of the earnings differential associated with difference in
years of schooling is a return to the ascription of behavioral traits (good
work habits, etc.) associated with schooling.45
How much employers are prepared to pay for these traits depends
upon how scarce they are, upon how valuable the prevailing technology
requiring fair employment practices (hiring and promotion policies
unrelated to race, ethnic background and sometimes age and sex of the appli-
cants) is in the nature of a tax on the use of "economical" substitutes for detailed
information about individuals.
This fact may well be at the core of the problem encountered by Mincer
[30, pp. 69—721 in explaining the partial regression (among various occupations)
of the proportion of male wage and salary workers (employed 50—52weeksin
1949) on median number of school years (mean incomes, proportion of workers
below 25andproportion employed in durable manufacturing or construction all
held constant). The sign of the partial regression coefficient was positive rather
than, as Mincer had expected, negative. The hypothesis offered here implies that
employers would be more likely to offer permanent jobs to those more educated
(wage rate constant) than to those less educated, which would produce a positive
coefficient. Mincer, himself (p. 71), suggests this as one possible explanation of
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makes them, upon the strength of their belief that absence of the traits
is irremediable (or excessively costly to remedy) by on-the-job training.
That is, the earnings differentials observed among various groups classi-
fied by age, occupation, race, ethnic origin, recency of migration, etc.,
reflect not only the premium placed upon desired traits, per se, but
also the strength of the presumed association (prejudice?) between these
traits and their visible correlates. For example, if it were believed that
only 10 per cent of the workers in a particular group would be satis-
factory permanent employees, the relative demand for their services at
a given wage rate would be lower than if the "believed percentage"
were 20.
Thus measured, skilldifferentialsreflect not only differences in
measured human capital, but also the strength of employer preferences
and beliefs that underlie hiring rules. These attitudes differ with the
cultural and educational differences (relevant to capacity to absorb
on-the-job training) among different segments of the population, as
perceived—correctly or otherwise—by employers. In countries where
such differences are large, employers tend sharply to distinguish different
grades of workers from one another—to distinguish noncompeting
groups—and pay relatively high premia for superiority; the reverse
applies where the labor force is more nearly homogeneous.
Of course, there is a strong empirical correlation between inequality
in the distribution of human capital and the cultural distances among
noncompeting groups. As Becker [4] has shown, the distribution of
human capital among the members of a population reflects both the
distribution of ability, and differential access to resources for investment.
But in a world where much human capital is created by employers as
an aspect of productive activity, access to this means of creating human
capital (jobs) also reflects culturally determined beliefs about relative
ability to learn and desire to work of "typical members" of different
ethnic groups, social backgrounds, etc.
Thus far, I have discussed the role of permanents and temporaries
only in relation to changes in the concentration of annual earnings.
However, differentials in earnings also affect the level of concentration.
Consider the contrary to fact case of an over-all earnings distribution
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(one for permanents and the other for temporaries) with differing
means, but equal variances.46 Then, if the ratio
mean annual earning of permanents
PT=meanannual earning of temporaries
increases and the variances of the subdistributions remain unchanged,
the coefficient of concentration will also increase. Also, if the parameters
and functional forms of both subdistributions remain unchanged, an
increase in the percentage of the population in the distribution with the
larger concentration of earnings (and a corresponding decrease in the
percentage of the population in the other distribution) will cause the
concentration of the over-all distribution to increase, and vice versa.
Obviously, one all-important question is whether the earnings dis-
tribution of permanents is more (or less) equally concentrated than
that of temporaries. I can think of no a priori reason for an opinion
on the direction of this inequality. What little evidence there is suggests
that the annual earnings of the unskilled are less equally distributed
than those of the skilled. Staehle [26] and Mincer [10] both found
that the dispersion of annual earnings was relatively greater among the
unskilled. Moreover, as Mincer pointed out [10, pp. 81—89], it is the
unskilled alone who constitute an exception to the positive association
of increased income inequality with increased average level of education.
Also Hanoch [38] found that inequality of family income among Israeli
urban wage earners was greater among new immigrants than among
"veterans"; this was after standardization for family size and continent
of origin. Hanoch's remarks strongly suggest that the new immigrant-
veteran dichotomy closely parallels that of permanents and temporaries.47
The evidence presented by Kravis [7, pp. 194—201] is generally
consistent with that of Staehle, Mincer and Hanoch. He found that
among U. S. urban consumer units, headed by blue collar workers,
income was most unequally distributed among those headed by un-
skilled workers, less unequally distributed among those headed by semi-
skilled workers and least among the skilled [7, pp. 195—96]. How-
46 Such a case could, depending upon the distance between the means and the
relative numbers in the two distributions, easily be bimodal. However, this is of
no significance for the present expository purpose.
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ever he also found that among white consumer units, incomes for
laborers and service workers 'in the north and in the south separately)
[7, p. 200J were more unequally distributed among white consumer
units than among nonwhite units. This last finding is contrary to the
implications of the other evidence cited in this paragraph and in the
preceding one, if these findings are all taken to bear upon the difference
in the concentration of annual earnings among permanent workers vis-a-
vis temporary workers.48
What appears to underlie the main drift of the cited findings of
Staehle, Mincer, Kravis and Hanoch is the belief that unskilled and
new immigrants are more likely to be unemployed or intermittently out
of the labor force than others. This view is given support by Miller
[29, pp. 58—631 who found that concentration of earnings among
occupational groups was greater, the greater their irregularity of em-
ployment. That is,the effect of irregular employment is to increase
the concentration and presumably (positive) skewness of the annual
earnings distribution among a given occupational group. However, this
effect appears to be important only at the lower end of the occupational
ladder where unemployment is a major phenomenon.
At the upper end of the occupational ladder, the effect of investment
in human capital (as already noted) is to increase earnings variance
and skewness within occupations as the average level of education in
an occupation rises, independently of interoccupational differences in un-
employment percentages. Thus it may be that the permanent-temporary
dichotomy is appropriate to explaining size distributional phenomena at
the lower end of the occupational ladder, but the human capital (or
possibly some other approach) is relevant to the upper end.
Probably the same factors that generate differential employment
opportunities as between temporaries and permanents also create dif-
48 It has been argued by a critic that comparing inequality of income distribu-
tion among different occupational groups involves serious ambiguity unless one
defines the groups so as to permit intragroup differences in earning capacity and
to indicate how much of the intergroup differences in inequality reflect differing
degrees of intragroup heterogeneity of earning power. The definitions of occupa-
tional groups used here are simply census definitions, and the only point being
made is that the incidence of unemployment makes a greater contribution to in-
come dispersion among unskilled temporaries than among other groups of work-
ers. Other factors, including intragroup heterogeneity of earning power among
fully employed workers, may also contribute to the observed intergroup differ-
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ferences of employment opportunities among categories of workers
within the permanent group. However, if this is true, its effect on the
size distribution is so muted as to be indistinguishable due to the scanty
data, crude tools of measurement and the brief contemporary time
period to which the data refer. The last point should be emphasized.
Itisentirely possible that at an earlier time, sharp differences in
individual earnings associated with social origin might have arisen
through channels other than irregularity of employment or differential
access to training, e.g., overt nepotism. However, these channels do not
seem to have had any appreciable effect on available records of income
distribution.
A final word of caution; the argument advanced concerning per-
manents and temporaries applies, without qualification, only where
family heads are the sole earners. To the not inconsiderable extent that
secondary workers are in the labor force, there are numerous complica-
tions discussed in the next section.4°
JV. The Size Distribution of Family income
As will become speedily apparent, this section is in the nature of a
brief appendix to the body of this paper. While the topic is important,
relatively little theoretical work has been done on it. To the extent that
the size distribution among families differs from that among individuals,
and in significant respects it does, discussion has been ad hoc and
empirical; the remarks were often judicious but rarely related to any
sort of theoretical framework.
I approach this problem as follows: assume the earning power of
each individual and his property to be. given. All property is assumed
to be allocated to one individual or another without remainder, and
with no joint ownership. Families are formed to enhance the utility of
each of the various members subject to various restraints of which the
most important are the rules of kinship that, in our society, require
parents to live with young children and, to a limited degree, children
to support aged parents.
40Originally,I had hoped to include a discussion of the relation of economic
development to income size distribution with particular reference to the pioneer-
ing work of Simon Kuznets. However, I do not feel that what I have written does
justice to the subject and, reluctantly, have decided to omit this section, hoping
to return to it on another occasion.246 Theory of Income Size Distribution
Subject to these restraints, the formation of a family may be treated
as a voluntary coalition of its members. The existence of such a coalition
implies that there is one or more allocations of benefits among the family
members such that each is better off within the family coalition than
outside it. Were this not the case, he would leave.
The principal economic advantage of coalescence is economy of scale.
These economies arise mainly in connection with housing costs; con-
sequently the price of housing services (house rents, for short) is of
crucial importance in this connection. In advanced economies at the
present time, domiciliary separation of adults from all adults other
than spouse is regarded as a superior good; i.e.,as the combined
income of a group of adults rises, the number of marriages constant,
so does the number of households (recipient units) that will be formed.
As the minimum number of persons per household is one, and separation
from a household is an all or none matter, there is a maximum number
of households that a given biosocial family (or entire community) can
form. This implies that, beyond a certain point, increases in per capita
income will cease to increase the number of families that will be formed
from a given population.
The effect of income level on family formation works as follows:
At both ends of the age distribution, young adults and retired and
semi-retired persons prefer to have their own domicile, if they can
afford it. Generally, the husband-wife nucleus of the family also prefers
that other adult members, especially older ones, live apart. Hence as
the collective income of a potential family group rises, so will the
propensity of its unmarried adult members to form separate units; call
this the "separation propensity." °°Also,the lower their average income,
and the higher the average house rent, the greater is the propensity of
unmarried individuals to share housing in order to save expenses.
In practice, in the process of separation, each individual takes his
earnings, transfers from outside the family, and property income with
him. Given that earnings are the primary source of income for most
individuals, and that typically earnings are appreciably higher in the
middle years than at the beginning or end of the life earning cycle, the
Theseparation propensity of a household will depend not only upon its level
of income, but also upon its distribution among the members. E.g., freedom from
parental supervision may have the highest priority for a young adult, but parents
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effect of an increase in the separation propensity is to increase the
relative number of recipient units (consisting disproportionately of the
very young and those past retirement) with incomes well below the
average.
To put the matter in a slightly different way, suppose that as the
per capita income of a community increases, the minimum income
which any individual living alone must accept (social minimum income)
also rises proportionately.51 Then, as per capita income rises, house
rents constant, individuals will detach themselves from higher income
households, and establish new low (near the social minimum) income
units. As these individuals take with them less than an equiproportional
share of the (original) household's income, the effect is to increase the
fraction of all households at or near the bottom of the distribution.
Whether this will increase distributional inequality, or the reverse,
depends crucially upon how inequality is measured. Almost surely
it will decrease the share in total income of the lowest decile or quintile
of recipient units because it creates a number of new units at or near
the social minimum. But its effect upon the share of those in (say) the
top decile might go either way depending upon (1) the positions of
the families losing members in the community's family income hierarchy
and (2) upon the share of original family income taken by departing
members.
(1) If the families undergoing separation were all below the top
dedile of income receivers, then the income share of the top decile
would be unaffected. The greater the relative number of member-losing
families in a given percentile, ceteris paribus, the greater the decline
in that percentile's income share. (2) The more nearly proportional the
income share taken by the departing members to that kept by the
remaining members, the greater the decline in the income share of the
member-losing families. Proportionality of family income shares among
family members depends mainly upon the degree of equality of earning
power among family members and upon the ratio of retirement income
per person to the earnings of principal earners.
The effect of what has here been termed the separation propensity
has been noted by Kuznets [39], Brady [40] and others. Kuznets [39]
has contended, in effect, that the operation of the propensity during the
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last two decades has contributed to the apparent reversal in the move-
ment toward greater equality among recipient-units during the preceding
quarter—half century. However, this contention has been disputed by
Miller [41]. Schultz's results (in his paper in this volume) suggests that
relative increases in the 18—24 year old component of the labor force
might have caused a widening of the income size distribution since 1945,
even if the separation propensity had been unrelated to per capita
income.52 I.e., young persons tend to be relatively low earners, and
given that a constant percentage of those at any from their
own households, an increase in their numbers relative to all adults will
tend to lower the income share of (say) the bottom decile of households.
The tendency for "peripheral" adults to separate from original house-
holds is only one of many channels by which interrelation among family
members' behavior may alter the distribution of family incomes, given
the distribution of individual incomes. Another channel is the effect on
age of marriage. That is, marriage involves a combining of incomes if
the wife continues working; this would tend to substitute one higher
income household for two with lower incomes. In most cases where
the family members are both young earners, this will tend to reduce
over-all distributional inequality. But a further effect arises when we
consider the possible changes in the interval between marriage and
birth of the first child at which point the mother usually withdraws
from the labor force. Yet another channel by which intrafamiial inter-
actions affect the size distribution of family income is the frequent
substitution of the wife's earnings for her husband's while the latter is
studying for an advanced degree. Still other channels can be readily
imagined.
Exploring these various channels is a matter for detailed and pains-
taking empirical investigation. The Brady-Klein paper in this volume
is an excellent example of the detailed work required. This work, while
requiring and often displaying great analytical acumen, consists mainly
of meticulous description; it does not attempt to test hypotheses. More-
over, while this work enlarges our knowledge of the income distribution
within particular segments of the population, it does not bear directly
upon the analysis of over-all distributional inequality.
Despite conceptual vagueness and ambiguity, explanation of the de-
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gree of over-all distributional inequality is a major reason for studying
income size distributions, and always has been. A major, if sometimes
implicit, purpose of analyzing inequality is to facilitate ranking of alterna-
tive states of an economy, differing in one or more respects, in terms
of degree of equality. Assume, for simplicity, that variance of income
(properly measured) is a satisfactory measure of inequality. Then, most
economists seeking to compare economic states with respect to inequality
would wish to compare the variance of (mathematically) expected
lifetime "family-share" incomes of the members of an individual cohort.
Empirical measurements of income dispersion are imperfect proxies for
this theoretical concept.53
At any given stage of his life, an individual's actual family-share in-
come is his imputed share of the income of the family in which he is
then located. Thus if individuals with relatively low earning power
typically marry those with higher earning power, family-share incomes
will be more equally distributed than individual incomes. The same
will be true if parents with higher incomes tend to have more children
than those with lower incomes, etc. As might be expected, the family-
share incomes of individuals are somewhat different from their own
life earning cycles; e.g., the life cycle of highly educated husbands in
family-share income will show less fluctuation than in individual income
because his low earnings in the early phase will be partially compensated
by his wife's earnings which will shrink after his own climb in the
post-training period.
The different life cycles in family-share incomes for typical persons
of different educational statuses generates—along with many other forces
—a life cycle of variances Within age classes. The over-all variance of a
steady state population will be an average of these intraage class
In the real world, "weight shifts" due to changes in relative
numbers in the different age classes will produce changes in the over-all
variance (degree of inequality). The significance one attaches to such
Inthe following remarks I abstract from the difficult and important problems
of correcting for differences in the effect of family composition—especially num-
ber in family—on real income. For the present purpose, income is money income.
This may and has led to serious errors where money and nonmoney income are
substitutes. But rather than offer a superficial treatment of a difficult subject, I
shall simply avoid the problem.
By a steady state, I mean one in which the number in each age class, in
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weight shifts should depend upon the inference drawn for the under-
lying change—if any—in the variance of expected lifetime family-share
incomes. If there is no change inferred—e.g., if an observed weight
shift is believed to reflect only a shift in the rate of population growth—
then an increase in observed (over-all) variance has no implications for
economic inequality, and conversely. It should be noted that changes in
life expectancy, age at birth of first child and other demographic phe-
nomena, as well as in lifetime earning variances, will affect over-all in-
equality.
But even within a steady state situation there are conceptual prob-
lems. Lifetime inequality is some sort of average of degrees of inequality
at different life cycle stages. If greater lifetime inequality parallels greater
inequality at each stage, then at least ranking of alternative economic
states, by degree of inequality, is simplified. But if there is greater in-
equality in stage 1 in state A and greater inequality in stage 2 in state B,
then comparing over-all inequality as between A and B requires weight-
ing the degrees of inequality in the two stages. To weight them equally
is possible—and implicitly what has always been done—but arbitrary.
To discount incomes so that what we analyze is the variance of the
present value of expected lifetime family-share incomes is conceivable
in principle. In practice, capital markets are imperfect and, moreover,
there is no reason why the variance of lifetime incomes under conditions
of Pareto-optimality should be especially relevant to social policy. Still
further, as Kuznets pointed out in his remarks at this conference, inter-
generational inequality (over several lifetimes) may be very important.
In short, measuring and comparing income inequality as between two
situations involves serious conceptual problems akin to those of welfare
economics. These problems will not be solved quickly.Bibliography
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